

Number 14

September 1987

THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT: AN EXERCISE IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING

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WHAT WAS ACHIEVED AT STOCKHOLM?

For nearly three years, the countries of East and West and the Neutral and non-aligned states (NNA) of Europe negotiated in Stockholm, Sweden, to find practical ways to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe through misunderstanding or misperception. The 35-nation¹ Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE, sometimes shortened to CDE) successfully concluded its work on September 1986², by adopting a set of Confidence- and Security-Building measures (CSBMs) meant to increase openness and predictability in the conduct of military affairs. The measures, which came into effect on 1 January 1987, meet the basic criteria of the conference mandate agreed at the Madrid Follow-up Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): "They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content,"³ and apply to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains in the USSR.

The Stockholm Document is the first multilateral East-West security agreement since 1975. Among its achievements are: the lowering of thresholds for notification of military activities to 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, and the extension of advance notification to 42 days; the exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable military activities for the next calendar year; constraining provisions obliging notification of exercises above 40,000 troops two years in advance; mandatory invitation of observers to observe military activities involving 17,000 or more troops; the right of on-site inspection, without a right of refusal, to verify compliance; and a declaratory statement which strengthened the observation of provisions related to the principle of non-use of force embodied in the Final Act.⁴

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?

The consensus reached by the 35 participating states to adopt the Stockholm Document raises a number of important questions which can only be partially answered now.

The Stockholm Conference was a political and regional conference with limited security objectives. By its mandate it was meant to address only the employment of conventional ground forces and their supporting air and naval activities. It neither limited force deployments nor reduced those forces by a single tank or soldier. What it did do, however, was to put in place 'security-building' measures by making military behaviour of participant states more open to scrutiny, and thus, make the "intentions" of states more transparent. Such transparency will help to make the threat of the use of force for political intimidation and "surprise attack" more difficult to achieve in the future.

Because the agreement at the Stockholm Conference is very recent, it is not yet possible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its relative importance in the overall European arms control matrix. What can be said, however, is that it represents a substantial improvement over the confidence-building measures agreed to at Helsinki in 1975.

Since World War II, arms control issues, both conventional and nuclear, have been central to East-West relations in Europe and have included both multilateral and bilateral fora. A deciding factor, no less applicable in Stockholm, affecting results in these negotiations, has been the superpower presence and the state of relations between them at any given time. In Stockholm the desire by all participants to reduce the risk of war encouraged the evolution of sufficient cooperative arrangements between the superpowers to permit consensus.

Arms control achievements in Europe have been difficult to achieve during the past several decades,

primarily because of an extremely complex set of problems. These included not only the traditional security issues of asymmetry in force structures, diverging strategic-operational concepts and force deployment levels, but also the complete political, diplomatic, economic and human relationship network. The Stockholm negotiation did not attempt to solve any of these problems. The agreement does not impinge on the sovereignty of any nation, nor does it compromise anyone's security interests. The document does provide, however, for increased mutual confidence and for diminished suspicions of the kind which could lead to dangerous miscalculations.

STOCKHOLM AND ARMS CONTROL

The CCSBMDE has shown that security and arms control are not mutually exclusive; rather, they go hand-in-hand. "Arms control arrangements should be assessed primarily in terms of their contribution to the maintenance of a stable East-West military balance"⁵, with the tacit recognition that long-term East-West "political rivalry will not be ended even by a comprehensive arms control agreement."⁶ The confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that have been adopted in Stockholm have a political effect: they build confidence by increasing communications and openness about military activities.

What the Stockholm Conference accomplished was a step in the multinational process, moving from the so-called first generation Helsinki CBMs to a system of new and more binding CSBMs that could be more effective in reducing the potential causes of armed conflict. This step can contribute in the political sense by reducing tensions and building a more constructive relationship between the East and West and could contribute to progress with the more difficult issue of actual arms reductions.

DIVERGING EAST-WEST INTERESTS

The fundamental policies of states are driven by long term and short term political objectives which reflect their vital interests.⁷ The pursuit of such vital interests by the superpowers and the two military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), has led to antagonisms that have not been conducive to the pursuit of arms control. These antagonisms, exacerbated by lack of East-West contact, traditional mistrust and public rhetoric, are real and stem from fundamental historical differences. It is not only a question of political differences concerning ideology, justice and liberty. Underlying the West's mistrust of the East's military intentions has been the existing division of Europe, which "was the result of Soviet military and political imperatives,"⁸ and the proposition that

capitalism must and will disappear.⁹ The East, for its part, creates a mirror image of those perceptions and sees the West as threatening its system.

Because of such differences, not surprisingly, the CSCE, while providing a forum for arms control, has brought face to face negotiators who use the same words to express different ideas. Thus the East and the West are best able to reach mutually acceptable compromises often only at the price of ambiguous formulae safeguarding, sometimes in the same single provision, their respective positions on basic concepts. The Stockholm Document is not exempt. For example, the CSBM calling for prior notification of certain military activities requires a numerical notification trigger of 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks if they are engaged in a military activity at any time. In addition the measure requires that certain conditions must be met for such notification: it has to be a single activity in the zone of application, conducted under a single operational command and organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments not necessarily subordinate to the same division. The last condition is ambiguous. The Western interpretation is that notification below divisional size is possible. This understanding is not shared by the WTO or by some of the NNA. The WTO maintains this condition enables states without divisional organizations (e.g. Canada and Norway) to participate in prior notification. In practice, while WTO divisions contain more tanks and artillery giving them similar combat power, they normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions.¹⁰ It is therefore unlikely that WTO prior notifications would be below two divisions.

While some differences are profound and are a challenge for every East-West negotiation, they do not foreclose the possibility of political and diplomatic results based on "the security interests of all"¹¹ in avoiding conflict. Results were possible at Stockholm, because of a common interest in reducing the risk of conflict through misperception, without jeopardizing perceived national security needs and the political will to do so. The outcome was a non-zero-sum game; that is, there were no 'losers' or 'winners'; benefits accrued to all concerned.

THE CSCE PROCESS

General developments and specific political events either promote arms control negotiations or make them more difficult. Where confidence exists, the prospects for progress are better. Arms control negotiations, however, can be instruments of practical policy and can themselves contribute to the improvement of international relations. Stockholm seems to confirm the latter instance. There the process was made easier because a previously agreed political framework for negotiations already existed — the CSCE.

By agreement the 35 countries participating in the CSCE process do so as individual sovereign states. In practice, however, there is a tendency for all states to group themselves around parent organizations representing NATO, the WTO and the NNA. Some, like the Holy See do not readily fit into any category and tend to act by themselves.

The CSCE was negotiated during the heyday of détente and marked the beginning of a new phase in East-West relations. It culminated in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The document represented an East-West compromise on a number of core political issues governing international relations: principles guiding relations between states and security (Basket I); provisions on commerce, industrial cooperation, science and technology (Basket II); humanitarian cooperation (Basket III) and questions relating to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. Not surprisingly, the document contains its share of ambiguities and circumspect language.¹² The Helsinki agreement also provided for periodic follow-up meetings. Meetings have been held at Belgrade, Madrid and presently (mid 1987) are in session in Vienna. In an attempt to improve the modest CBMs agreed in Basket I at Helsinki, the Madrid follow-up meeting mandated a conference on CSBMs to be held in Stockholm.

The only obligatory Helsinki CBM was to notify manoeuvres exceeding 25,000 troops, 21 days in advance. All other CBMs such as the invitation of observers and other notification requirements were voluntary. Moreover, participant states whose territory extended beyond Europe (the USSR and Turkey) were exempt from all CBMs 250 kilometres beyond their frontiers.¹³

As all parts of the Helsinki document are interrelated, none is deemed more important than another. The Stockholm Document has no political life of its own but remains part of the overall CSCE process. Necessarily, the best measure of the usefulness of the CSCE process will remain the willingness of participant sovereign states, which have accepted the CSCE obligations on a politically binding (not legal) basis, to implement what they have agreed to do.

THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN

Unlike the propitious timing of the Helsinki meeting, the Stockholm Conference opened in January 1984, a time when tensions had greatly increased in East-West political relations. A number of factors contributed to this situation: Soviet SS-20 ballistic missile deployments in Europe (1977); the signing and the US non-ratification of the Salt II Treaty (1979); the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979); the "Dual-track Decision" by NATO on long-range theatre nuclear forces, partly to counter SS-20

deployments (1979); the unnotified Soviet exercises around Poland (1980-81), seen by many as contrary to Helsinki obligations; martial law in Poland (1981); President Reagan's announcement on the strategic defence initiative (1983); the downing of a Korean airliner by a Soviet MiG (1983); the Soviet walk-out from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) following NATO deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (1983); and failure to agree to a date for the next session of MBFR talks. By the end of 1983 almost all formal arms control contacts between East and West had been severed. Only one contact survived: the consensus of 35 CSCE states reached at Madrid in 1983 to open the CCSBMDE on 17 January 1984 in Stockholm.

As the only game in town at the time, Stockholm initially became a venue for a much wider range of East-West political issues than the negotiation of CSBMs. This was both an advantage and a disadvantage for the Stockholm negotiations because progress became linked to events, external to the conference, which could either lead to a substantive success or doom it to failure. In the event, the multilateral nature of the CSCE process provided both a helpful forum and a venue for informal contacts on security issues other than CSBMs. Clearly progress in Stockholm depended on a wider measure of political confidence-building such as the return to the negotiating table of bilateral and 'bloc-to-bloc' discussions. As the bilateral contacts and encouragement from all participant states were in the end crowned with success, it may be said that Stockholm provided a useful starting point for other negotiations as well.

THE POLITICAL INCENTIVES FOR AGREEMENT

The conference opened at the Foreign Ministers' level and by doing so underlined the importance of high-level political dialogue. It also provided the means for bilateral, ministerial level contacts which resulted in the resumption of MBFR in March 1984 and the Geneva nuclear and space talks a year later. Moreover, the Soviet Union was interested in participating at Stockholm in a conference which essentially posed no security risk, and allowed them to pursue a long held political desire to create "a system of collective security" to encompass the whole of Europe.¹⁴

The relationship between Stockholm and other arms control fora ensured that progress at the conference would be influenced by the political climate of superpower relations. Examination of the conference progress seems to confirm this assessment and it is possible to discern in the conference a rhythm ranging from the "dialogue of the deaf" (1984), through the

filtering process and definition of common ground (1985), to negotiation and agreement (1986). It is also possible to identify political impulses at key points in the conference which were necessary to ensure progress. Some may question why it took so long to reach agreement. The answer lies in the fact that Europe remains the focal point of East-West security concerns affecting intra-European relations, relations between superpowers in Europe, and relations between the superpowers and Europe. It would not have been possible to accelerate progress until the process matured without running the risk of stalemate, or settling for a mini-package of non-binding Helsinki-type CBMs.

DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Five separate proposals on CSBMs were advanced during the first year of negotiations at Stockholm: by NATO, Romania, the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states, the Soviet Union and Malta.¹⁵ The proposals were expected to meet the criteria of the conference mandate agreed at Madrid. CSBMs, to be agreed, would be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification."¹⁶

A major difference between the East and West during the negotiations was the interpretation of the mandate. Based on a well documented Madrid negotiating record, the West, supported by some NNA, maintained that the so-called "functional approach" provided for the notification of **only** those military activities in the adjoining sea area and air space that were functionally linked with notifiable activities on land. In other words, both criteria called for by the mandate would have to be met: activities affecting security in Europe, as well as constituting a part of such activities taking place in Europe.¹⁷ The East argued for the "geographical approach" maintaining only one criterion was necessary: all activities including independent air and naval activities that affected European security in any way were subject to notification. Acceptance of the "geographic approach" would have extended the zone of application beyond Europe.

While the West expected that the proposals submitted at the beginning of the conference by different states or groups of states to differ in degree, those suggested by the USSR differed both in degree and in kind, and for the most part represented a radical departure from the mandate. The Soviets focussed on broad political declaratory measures which, they argued, would ensure peaceful military behaviour. Their proposal repeated the WTO January 1983 Prague Declaration which called for measures con-

cerning: non-first use of nuclear weapons; a treaty on non-use of force and maintenance of peaceful relations; curtailment of military budgets and expenditures; ridding Europe of chemical weapons and non-stationing of chemical weapons where there were none before; and nuclear weapon-free zones. Such proposals were neither militarily effective nor verifiable and most were already under consideration elsewhere. Only the last section addressed military CSBMs and called for elaboration of Helsinki Final Act measures as well as limitations on ground force military manoeuvres.

The proposals of the West and the NNA were more in concert with the mandate and emphasized the adoption of militarily effective measures that would help to make military activity more transparent and predictable. The West proposed CSBMs on: exchange of military information; exchange of annual forecasts of activities notifiable in advance; notification of military activities 45 days in advance; observation of certain military activities; compliance and verification; and development of means of communications. The NNA put forward 12 measures: prior notification of major military manoeuvres; prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres; prior notification of military manoeuvres involving amphibious, sea-transported, air-borne, air-mobile forces or combinations thereof; prior notification of major military movements; prior notification of major military activities; invitation of observers to military manoeuvres and movements; prior notification of redeployment of major military units; notification of certain other major military activities; exchange of annual calendars of pre-planned major military activities; ceiling for forces engaged in a major military manoeuvre; ceiling for amphibious, air-borne, air-mobile forces engaged in military manoeuvres; and constraints on the deployment of forces in areas to be determined with capability for sustained offensive operations. The West maintained that adoption of militarily effective measures would be an indication of political willingness on the part of participant states to pursue peaceful relations. The NNA proposals were politically important because they largely conformed to the mandate and helped to define the 'centre of gravity' of the conference.

During the first year of the negotiations the only common ground that was identifiable was the apparent willingness of all participants to elaborate further the Helsinki CBMs, (prior notification of military manoeuvres, movements and transfers and observation), a far cry from "new, effective and concrete actions" called for by the mandate.

INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS

Stockholm ebbed and flowed in response to political events which influenced East-West relations, from the

* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."

time the foreign ministers opened the Stockholm meeting in January 1984, to the time of the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in October 1986. It responded to a particular rhythm of political events like the death of the Soviet "caretaker" leaders and the re-election of President Reagan for a second term of office. With the takeover by a new leader and with the US elections later that year, not much change could have been expected in formal Eastern positions. Publicly the old Soviet line was signalled by the boycott of the US-hosted Summer Olympics in April. At the conference, however, the dialogue, which continued in plenary sessions, in corridors and in the capitals, served to broaden mutual understanding.

June 1984 witnessed an important political signal by the West when President Reagan stated in Dublin that the US would be ready to discuss the Soviet Union's interest in the principle of non-use of force if the Soviet Union would negotiate practical measures to give concrete effect to that principle. It was not until the end of 1984 that this initiative was crowned with an agreement on a working structure that enabled a more detailed exchange of views. Although agreement on the working structure at first glance seemed to be a merely procedural matter, it had the seeds of substance in it. It divided the proposals into two working groups, one on notification and observation, and the second, on all other proposals that had been tabled. This arrangement made it possible to assess whether or not proposals conformed to the mandate, and to provide a filtering process which would determine what proposals ultimately could achieve consensus. The filtering process lasted throughout most of 1985.

External political events in 1985 again influenced progress at Stockholm; principal among them were the resumption of nuclear talks between the US and the USSR at Geneva and the accession to power of a new-style Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. The shooting of a US Military Mission Liaison officer in the German Democratic Republic, however, reminded the conference of the precarious nature of confidence-building and the problems which would have to be solved on verification. Observance of the Tenth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, and importantly, the US-USSR Geneva Summit statement which committed both countries to seek a successful conclusion to Stockholm, were other events which affected the dynamics of the conference.

With the settlement of the leadership succession at the Kremlin and the recommencement of Geneva talks, the main features of the conference began to become clear. Although a considerable gap remained between the details of NATO and WTO proposals, the latter were important not so much for what they said, but for what they omitted to mention. WTO references to most declaratory proposals, particularly nuclear issues,

became muted, and non-use of force took centre stage. The meeting settled down to an exchange of ideas and precise details about the substance of material which would ultimately become a concluding document.

The West's contribution to the filtering process was the introduction of six working papers, one for each of the NATO-proposed measures (exchange of information, annual forecasts, notification of military activities, observation, verification and communication). A compilation of the six papers emphasized that the measures formed part of a coherent whole. The East introduced five working documents: a draft treaty on non-use of force; limitation of military manoeuvres to 40,000 troops, notification of major manoeuvres and transfers of land, naval and air forces respectively (at thresholds of 20,000 troops; 30 combat ships with 100 aircraft; and 200 aircraft independently). The WTO proposals lacked precision on observation and verification. Late in the year, the NNA, after considerable internal discussion, tabled a document elaborating their proposals. These showed that while seven of the NNA proposals addressed areas also considered by the West, the approach to information, calendars, notification, observation and verification differed in detail. For example, two important differences were that information was not considered a separate proposal and verification appeared only to be a function of observation. By mid 1985, however, it was possible to identify six areas for focussed discussion: thresholds and unit of account for notified activities; effective use of observers; verification; information exchange; non-use of force; and constraints.

The differences between East and West on all discussion areas were considerable. The East rejected the West's proposals on structural threshold*, information exchange, and "out-of-garrison"¹⁸ activity, minimized the observer requirement and limited verification to national technical means (NTMs) and consultation. The West rejected the constraint proposal, that is, the limitation of 40,000 troops, on grounds that it had no effect on the WTO, while it would affect NATO's exercise practice. The NNA maintained their traditional role of evenhandedness, but clearly their ideas of strengthening confidence and security through cooperation were closer to that of the West, particularly on such issues as notification and observation.

Following the midsummer break and bilateral East-West consultations, the conference was ready for the next step of establishing an informal work structure with selected NNA representatives as moderators (co-ordinators). Just before the Geneva Summit, an

* Unit of notification based on a standard ground force organization such as a division. An organized unit is more significant militarily than an aggregation of troops of the same size. Moreover, verification requirements are simpler and less intrusive.

informal work structure was adopted in October, which for the first time, provided the means for actual drafting. It was not until February 1986, however, that a first provisional text was agreed and noted.

1985 did not end on an optimistic note. The conference was stalemated on the naval and air issue (the mandate interpretation issue) and the East refused to negotiate any other measures until that issue was solved. The East also indicated that progress on CSBMs was linked to progress on the non-use of force, and the West threatened a reverse linkage. One measure, however, observation, thanks to effective corridor work by the Finnish coordinator, did show some prospects for the future.

In 1986 the tempo of events increased. In a January speech, General Secretary Gorbachev offered to postpone the question of naval activities to the next stage of the conference. He also emphasized in the same speech and repeated at the 27 February Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) meeting, the importance of verification in disarmament. The foreign Ministers of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, on a visit to the Stockholm Conference, stressed the importance their countries attached to the conference as a key instrument for enhancing European stability and security.

In February 1986 Anatoly Shcharansky, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, was allowed to leave Moscow and emigrate to Israel. While linkage between the Stockholm Conference and the 'Third Basket' had no direct role in the negotiations, it was present in subliminal form as part of the overall CSCE process. Moreover, the follow-up meeting, in Vienna, scheduled to begin 4 November 1986 would review and weigh the results of all the meetings as well as the implementation record of the Helsinki Final Act. With lack of progress at some meetings important to the West¹⁹, the Soviets may have been concerned that the West could withhold agreement at Stockholm. Shcharansky's release therefore may have been seen as a useful political signal to make to the West.

At the time, however, Shcharansky's release did not appear to have a direct impact on the negotiations as the East and the West continued deadlocked on notifying participation of airforces. In the wider mosaic of consensus making, however, Shcharansky's release probably made a contribution.

Having made a gesture to one part of the CSCE process, in April Mr. Gorbachev unveiled a new initiative in East Berlin. With an eye to the future he expressed Soviet readiness to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals. This new arms control initiative appeared so important to the Soviets that the US anti-terrorist air raid on Libya, also in April, did not result in any discernible rhetoric or increased pressure on the West to notify independent air activities.

In response to General Secretary Gorbachev's statement on conventional disarmament in Europe, the NATO foreign ministers released a communiqué in Halifax, in May, advising that a High Level Task Force would examine issues related to conventional arms control. The communiqué also indicated that in order for there to be progress in reductions of any kind, Stockholm would have to achieve results. In June the Soviets responded with more detailed reduction proposals.²⁰

In the same month at the Stockholm Conference the West signalled it was ready to consider thresholds above the previous NATO proposal of a 6,000 troop level and indicated a willingness to put aside the notification of mobilization provided reciprocal steps were taken by the WTO with respect to Western concerns, namely the functional approach* to notification and on-site inspection provisions for verification.

The Stockholm Conference remained a "cliff-hanger" until the opening of the last session in August. Three weeks before the conference ended, the threshold and notification stalemate became unblocked by the striking of a bargain and other outstanding problems sequentially fell into place. For notification of certain military activities the West accepted a numerical threshold rather than the preferred structural threshold based on ground force divisions. The threshold agreed was higher than that wished for by the West (6,000 versus the agreed 13,000). Neither independent naval or air activity as desired by the East would be notified except as part of a notifiable activity on land. The last problem to be solved was on-site inspection. To ensure completion by the agreed deadline, the clock had to be stopped.

One of the unique achievements of the Stockholm Conference was the agreement on compliance and verification based on the concept of on-site inspection on demand. The East had consistently dismissed the idea of an independent verification measure and treated the proposal as tantamount to spying. The West held to its position and argued that on-site inspection provided equal opportunity for all. The NNA had a much weaker verification proposal which would have the effect of exempting some of their activities from inspection. In the end the Western proposal provided the main structure on which the present measure is based. There was no movement on the issue however, until Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, made a statement at a plenary meeting accepting on-site inspections. The West's preference would have been to provide its own transportation means. Akhromeyev called for the inspected state to provide vehicles and aircraft to be used by inspectors. Encouraged by the West, the NNA, in a last minute

* See page 4.

attempt at compromise, suggested that aircraft be supplied by countries not members of an alliance, but this was categorically rejected by the East. Notwithstanding, the final rendition of the Stockholm Document states that aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between inspecting and receiving states and under certain circumstances an inspecting state will be permitted to use its own vehicles.

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF STOCKHOLM

Political will was required by all sides to reach an agreement because, in the end, each participating side had to give up some part of its proposals. The East gained only one of their declaratory measures, the non-use of force, although not as a treaty or even as a separate document. Notification of independent air and naval activities and numerical constraints on the size of exercises are not included. The numerical threshold for notification is lower than that originally envisaged by the East. National Technical Means (NTMs) and consultation as means of verification have been replaced by challenge on-site inspection with no right of refusal. A mandatory observation regime is in place.

The West failed to get its measure on the exchange of information on force locations, notification of mobilization, out-of-garrison activity and a lower threshold. While some textual ambiguity exists which could lead to potential interpretation problems, the overall result goes far beyond a mere cosmetic gesture and has the potential to increase openness in the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The political importance of Stockholm as part of a process seems to be confirmed by the issuance of the Budapest Appeal and the Brussels Declaration, described below.

THE BUDAPEST APPEAL

The Budapest Appeal was issued in June 1986 by the Consultative Committee of WTO states. Much of what was contained in it and the accompanying Communiqué was 'déjà vu' and familiar to the West's arms control negotiators. The most notable element in the appeal is the proposal to undertake initial troop reductions by NATO and the WTO of 100,000 to 150,000 troops respectively and an unspecified quantity of tactical aviation, each within one or two years. If successful, this could be followed by further reductions as a result of which, by the early 1990s, both alliances' troop levels could be reduced by some 25% as compared with present levels.

Regrettably, like the initial Soviet proposals at Stockholm, both the Appeal and the Communiqué are replete with political statements concerning, for example, "the struggle for peace, socialism, and against

imperialism"²¹ which detract from the seriousness of the proposal and tend to point, at least initially, to a propaganda motive for the exercise. Only time will tell whether or not the necessary political will exists to tackle comprehensive conventional arms reductions in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The East-West, bloc-to-bloc, MBFR negotiations have not been able during almost fourteen years of trying, to reduce NATO and WTO troop levels in a much more limited area.²² The West, however, in the Halifax Communiqué and more recently through the Brussels Declaration, has signalled its readiness to consider the latest Budapest proposal in a comprehensive manner.

THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION

The Brussels Declaration, issued by NATO foreign ministers in December 1986, in response to the WTO Budapest initiative signalled the West's readiness to discuss enhancing conventional stability in the whole of Europe. The Declaration underlined the military imbalance and asymmetries between the East and the West and identified six objectives which would need to be agreed in a mandate for negotiations: the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces designed to eliminate disparities; a step-by-step approach which guarantees undiminished security for all; elimination of the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action; additional CSBMs to further increase openness and calculability of military behaviour; application to the whole of Europe in a manner to reduce regional imbalance and prevent circumvention; and verification based on exchange of information and on-site inspection.²³

The third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna has been in session since November 1986. Initial discussions have reviewed the record of compliance with the Helsinki Final Act provisions and at mid-1987 had only just begun to discuss the new security initiatives. The answer as to what direction the East-West dialogue will take from here on is analogous to the answer given to Alice in Wonderland by the Cheshire Puss — "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to."

CONCLUSION

The Stockholm experience has shown that it is possible to achieve adequate results on some arms control issues provided objectives are limited, national vital interests are not placed at risk and a step-by-step approach is followed. Moreover, arms control negotiations cannot be separated from political relations, which, as Stockholm has shown, need not be good but must not prevent positive interactions.

In any negotiation where superpowers participate, their relationship will always be a major factor affecting

the end results. In a multinational process such as the CSCE, which relies on consensus, the political influence of individual states remains an important factor, particularly if they are able to gain support for their positions from other participants. Thus in the final analysis a 'dyktat' by any state is not possible.

Stockholm will not prevent those states wishing to pursue political objectives by the use or threat of force from doing so. A political price, however, will have to be paid by a delinquent state and the agreed CSBMs can assist in providing additional warning so that military countermeasures could be taken by those feeling threatened.

Though modest, the Stockholm Document is a first comprehensive and concrete step towards increasing political stability and security in Europe. That is not to say that confidence-building stops at Stockholm; on the contrary, much remains to be done and a follow-on conference with the same or an expanded mandate would be a logical next step forward.

NOTES

1. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the UK, the USA and Yugoslavia.
2. At 22:56 hours on 19 September, it was necessary to stop the clock in accordance with CSCE practices, in order to finish the work at the agreed deadline. The document was finally adopted at 11:35 hours on 22 September.
3. *Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting 1980 of the Representatives of the Participating States of the CSCE*, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, Madrid, 1983, p. 38.
4. *Document of the Stockholm Conference on CSBM and Disarmament in Europe*, Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE, Stockholm, 1986, pp. 23-40.
5. Z. Brzezinski, *The Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s*, Plenary Paper I, IISS Annual Conference, Ottawa, 1983, p. 26.
6. *Ibid.* p. 26.
7. B. Brodie, *War and Politics*, New York, 1973, p. 342.
8. R.A.D. Ford, *The Legacy of Yalta*, Maclean's, 11 February 1985, pp. 16-17.
9. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, *Peace*, New York, 1983, pp. 624-625.
10. *NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons*, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984, fig. 2, p. 8.
11. Madrid Mandate, p. 38.
12. R.S. Dirnecker, *Between Helsinki and Belgrade: A Balance Sheet of CSCE*, Strategic Review, Vol. V, No. 4, Washington, 1977, pp. 74-83.
13. *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act*, Helsinki, 1975, pp. 85-87.
14. M. Dobrosielski, *CSCE: A Polish View*, Warsaw, 1976, p. 18.
15. NATO, SC1, 24 January 1984; Romania, SC2, 25 January 1984; NNA, SC3, 9 March 1984; USSR, SC4, 8 May 1984; and Malta, SC5, 8 November 1984.
16. Madrid Mandate, p. 38.
17. Madrid Mandate, p. 38.
18. An all-embracing term meant to solve the definition problem of 'movement,' 'exercise' and 'manoeuvre'.
19. Experts' meetings on: *The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes* in Berne, March 1984; *Human Rights* in Ottawa, April 1984; *Human Contacts*, Berne, April 1986.
20. The Communiqué of the "Budapest Appeal", 10-11 June 1986.
21. Communiqué on the *Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States*, Budapest, 11 June 1986, Section VI, p. 13.
22. The MBFR area of reductions consists of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries for NATO and that of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the WTO.
23. *Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control*, Press Communiqué, Brussels, 11 December 1986.

Colonel C.A. Namiesniowski recently retired from the Canadian Armed Forces; he was a military adviser to the Canadian Delegations at the CSCE Madrid and Stockholm meetings.

The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author, and should not be taken to represent the views of the Institute and its Board.

Published by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Additional copies are available from the Institute: 307 Gilmour Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 0P7.

Le présent exposé est également publié en français.

ISBN: 0-662-15642-0